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Criminal Procedure-Effect upon Appeal of Plea of
Guilty in Recorders Court
Defendant was charged in a recorders court with assault with a
deadly weapon. He was without counsel and pleaded guilty. Upon
appeal to the Superior Court, from a judgment of two years' imprisonment, counsel for D sought to withdraw the plea of guilty entered
below. This motion was refused. On appeal questioning this ruling
it was held: That the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty was addressed to the sound discretion of the Superior Court judge and could
not as a matter of right be withdrawn.' Three judges dissented and
were of the opinion that the statute controlling appeals from the particular recorders court involved entitled the D to enter an original
plea of not guilty. The majority purports to follow State v. Warren,2
which was a criminal case originating in a justice of the peace court.
There the plaintiff pleaded guilty to the use of profane language in
an area prohibited by statute. He was fined fifty dollars and appealed
to the Superior Court. The report of the case fails to show what his
plea was in the Superior Court; however, it is stated that the record
shows that D was found guilty by a jury. This would be inconsistent
with a plea of guilty. The Superior Court granted D's motion to
arrest judgment on the grounds that the statute under which he was
convicted was unconstitutional, and D's plea of guilty precluded him
from raising other questions. The dissent points out that the Warren
case did not directly raise the question here presented, and that the
original record in that case reveals that there was also a verdict by the
jury in the Superior Court.
Assuming that the cases raise the same question, the Warren case
would seem to be authority, since the statute regulating appeals from
the particular recorders court here involved8 and that regulating appeals
from a justice of the peace in criminal cases are similar.4 This comparison is accepted by the dissent.
Although the case is fundamentally one of statutory construction,
it involves the effect of a plea of guilty. Just what is the effect of
such a plea? A plea of guilty is a formal confession of guilt before
the court in which the defendant is arraigned, and differs from a volun'State v. Crandall, 225 N. C. 148, 33 S. E. (2d) 861 (1945).
2 113 N. C. 683, 18 S. E. 498 (1893).
and any person con'N. C. PuB. LOCAL LAWS (1911) c. 74 §7(e): "...
victed in said court shall have the right to appeal to the Superior Court of
Beaufort County and upon such appeal the trial in the Superior Court shall
be de novo on papers certified from said recorders court."
'N. C. GEr. STAT. (1943) §15-17: "The accused may appeal from the
sentence of the justice to the Superior Court of the county. . . . In all such
cases of appeal, the trial shall be anew, without prejudice from the former
proceedings."
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taiy confession in that the latter is merely evidence of guilt.5 Such
a plea, accepted and entered by the court, is a conviction or the equivalent of a conviction of the highest order. 6 The courts agree that once
the plea is accepted it is equivalent to a conviction in that the court
may give judgment thereon. It is when a plea of guilty is entered in
an inferior court, and the defendant is brought before a higher court
upon appeal, with the upper court looking back on the plea, that differences in a guilty plea and a conviction have been noted.
In this state a conviction in an inferior court cannot be used as
evidence of guilt when the defendant is tried anew upon appeal to the
Superior Court. 7 On the other hand, when a defendant pleads guilty
in an inferior court the plea is admissable as evidence of defendant's
guilt on trial de novo in the Superior Court.8 Again, a defendant appealing from a conviction upon a plea of not guilty in an inferior court
must plead anew in the Superior Court,9 while under the doctrine of
the principal case, if a defendant pleads guilty in an inferior court
and appeals, he comes into the Superior Court with that plea.
Courts of other states have made further distinctions. A statute
requiring twenty-four hours delay between a conviction and sentence
does not apply to a plea of guilty. 10 Where a physician or an attorney
pleads guilty to a crime involving moral turpitude, and in a separate
action to revoke his license, under a statute providing that same may
be done upon "conviction," the statute was held not to apply to a plea
of guilty before final judgment was entered thereon." 1 To the same
effect, where a statute provided a heavier penalty for persons previously
"convicted," and defendant had pleaded guilty on three previous occasions and sentence had been suspended, it was held that he had not
been thrice convicted within the meaning of the statute. 12
It is due to a guilty plea's conclusiveness, together with its collateral
and subsequent effect, that it is often stated that it should be accepted
with caution.' 3 The caution should be exercised in proportion to the
gravity of the offense. 14 At least three states require by statute that
149 Ill.
N. C.
(1908).
'7 State
Marksv.v.Branner,
People, 204
248,559,
68 63
N. S.
E. E.
436169
(1903).
8

State v. John Moore, 209 N. C. 44, 182 S. E. 692 (1935).
State v. Libby, 209 N. C. 363, 183 S. E. 414 (1936) ; State v. Ingram, 204

N. C. 557, 168 S. E. 837 (1933).

State v. Lueders, 214 N. C. 558, 200 S. E. 22 (1938).
" State ex rel. Chicola v. Gen. Mgr. La. State Penitentiary, 188 La. 694,

'

177 So. 804 (1937).

" State Medical Board v. Rodgers, 190 Ark. 266, 79 S. W. (2d) 83 (1935);
ex parte Tanner, 40 Ore. 31, 88 P. 301 (1907).
" People ex rel. Marcley v. Lawes, 254 N. Y. 249, 172 N. E. 487 (1930).
" 4 BL. Comm. 329; Note (1931) 79 U. oF PA. L. REv. 484 (deals with
withdrawals of pleas of guilty, but cites numerous authorities for the proposition
stated).
'" BisnoF, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, vol. 1, §795.
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the trial judge admonish the defendant before accepting his plea of
guilty, 15 and it has been held apart from any statutory provisions, that
the trial judge should give admonition to the effect of the guilty plea
before it is accepted and sentence given thereon. 16 Other jurisdictions
leave to the discretion of the trial judge whether to accept or refuse
such a plea from the defendant, and in the absence of explanatory evi17
dence will presume that D understood the significance of his plea.
Since the effect of a plea of guilty gives its greatest difficulty when
a court is exercising a retrospective view of the plea, the problem
becomes in part one of the relationship between the inferior courts and
the Superior Court. The constitution allows the legislature to provide.
methods other than jury trials for petty misdemeanors, with the right
to appeal.' s Thus it is held that recorders courts are constitutional,
and a defendant's right to a jury trial is not denied when he is allowed
a jury trial in the Superior Court.' 9 Assuming that the right to a
jury trial is preserved by the constitutional right to an appeal, when
and under what circumstances may the right be waived? It may be
waived in the Superior Coukt by a plea of guilty entered there. 20 The
defendant in a misdemeanor case may consent to a verdict of less
than twelve, and by not objecting to the entry in the record that it
was a verdict of a jury may estop himself to deny that he has had a
jury trial. 21 He may likewise waive the right by consenting to a
-judgment of an inferior court or by not appealing, although the statutory time limit for the appeal has not run.2 2

Has a defendant who

pleads guilty in an inferior court waived this right? The dissent thinks
not where the statute defining the scope of the appeal from the inferior court provides that ".

.

. upon such appeal the trial in the

Superior Court shall be de novo." The majority might have given a
short answer to the whole question by simply holding that the right
to a trial de novo, by the express terms of the statute, applied where a
defendant was convicted in the recorders court and had no application
' ILL ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1934), c. 38, §732; COLO. STAT. ANN.
(Michie, 1935), c. 48, §482; TEXAS ANN. CODE CRIM. PRoC. (Vernon, 1938),
art. 501. Cf. MICE. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1936), §28-1058.
2'Mislik v. State, 184 Ind. 72, 110 N. E. 551 (1915); Lowe v. State, 111
Md. 1, 73 A. 637, 24 L. R. A. (N.s.) 439, 18 Ann. Cas. 744 (1909); Hordzog
v. State, 47 Okla. 244, 293 P. 1107 (1930).
" State v. Ingram, 204 N. C. 557, 168 S. E. 837 (1933); State v. Hill, 81
W. Va.
676, 95 S. E. 21, 6 A. L. R. 687 (1918).
' 8 N. C. CoNs?. ART. 1, §13.
" State v. Pulliam, 184 N. C. 681, 114 S. E. 394 (1922); State v. Shine,
149 N. C. 480, 62 S. E. 1080 (1908).
2 State v. Branner, supra note 5.
" State v. Robert Wheeler. 185 N. C. 670, 116 S. E. 413 (1923).
2 State v. Lockey, 191 N. C. 571, 132 S. E. 570 (1926); State v. Pasley, 180
N. C. 695, 104 S. E. 533 (1920).
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where the defendant pleaded guilty.2 3 It is evident that the court
did not intend to make any distinction between "conviction," as used
in the statute and a plea of guilty, for the decision purports to follow
a case where the appeal was from a justice of the peace. There the
relative statute provides that the defendant may appeal from the sentence and upon such appeal the trial shall be anew, without prejudice
from the former proceedings.2 4 These latter provisions merely spell out
the. right to a trial de iwvo.
Where the statute provides for a trial de iwvo, just what do such
provisions mean? Generally de novo means anew, but 'it. is not so
broad in misdemeanor cases as to prevent a trial in the Superior Court
on the original warrants. 25 Neither are the warrants so binding as to
prevent amendments, 26 but they cannot be so amended as to charge a
new or a different offense. 27 The Superior Court when considering a
23
case de novo may increase the punishment given below.
When it comes to the effect of a plea of guilty entered below upon
the statutory provisions for an appeal and a trial de novo the courts
seem to have taken three views: (1) The right to appeal is nonexistent after such a plea is entered or is waived thereby. (2) The
right to appeal is not affected, but the guilty plea is retained in the
new trial. (3) The right to appeal is not affected and the defendant
may plead anew in the appellate trial.
The courts taking the first view are in keeping with the general
rule as stated by law encyclopedias that in a criminal case a party
cannot have a judgment properly entered on a plea of guilty reviewed
by appeal or error proceedings. 29 Statutory or constitutional provisions for an unrestricted appeal from the inferior court does not alter
the result. These courts treat the guilty plea as a waiver of the
existing right.3 0 Although these courts speak as if there is no right
of appeal after such plea is entered, some merely decide that the appeal
should be dismissed. 3 ' Courts of this view make exceptions when the
. "Cf.

People v. Brown, 87 Cal. 261, 286 P. 859 (1930).

(Statute provided:

"If any person convicted of any criminal offense before any justice of the peace,
shall wish to appeal to the county court he or she shall . . . etc." Held: Statute
did 2not give right to an appeal when defendant pleaded guilty before the justice.)
1 Supra note 4.
" State v. Boykin, 211 N. C. 407, 191 S. E. 18 (1937).
"' State v. Hunt, 197 N. C. 707, 150 S. E. 353 (1929); State v. Johnson,
188 N. C. 591, 125 S. E. 183 (1924) ; State v. Millis, 181 N. C. 530, 106 S. E.
677 (1921).
'7 State v. Goff, 205 N. C. 545, 172 S. E. 407 (1934).
" State v. Stafford, 113 N. C. 635, 18 S. E. 256 (1893).
202 Am. JUR. 987; 2 R. C. L., Appeal and Error, §41.
"0State v. Eckert, 123 Wash. 403, 212 P. 551 (1923); State v. Putnam, 121
Wash. 438, 209 P. 679 (1922).
8"Stokes
v. State, 122 Ark. 56, 182 S. W. 521 (1916); Dudney v. State,
136 Ark. 453, 206 S. W. 898 (1918); Philpot v. State, 65 N. H. 250, 20 A. 955

(1890).
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case on appeal is one that the court thinks is meritorious. 32 The
weight of authority is against this view and will allow an appeal from
a court not of record where the statute provides for an unrestricted
33
appeal.
The courts taking the second view treat the plea of guilty and its
entry upon the record as the defendant's plea upon appeal, the effect
being to limit the appellate court's consideration to those things not
admitted by the plea of guilty. Perhaps the leading case for this
position is Commonwealth v. Mahoney,3 4 where Grey, C. J. said, "If
he pleads guilty on his first arraignment, and the plea is received by
the court and recorded, it is an admission of all the facts well charged
in the indictment or complaint and a waiver of his right to a jury trial
thereon." The difference between the first two views is that the first
makes the plea a waiver of the right to appeal while the second
makes it a waiver of the right to a jury trial.3 5 Courts adopting this
position make the same rule applicable to a plea of not guilty entered
below.3 6
The courts adopting the third view say the stated rule that a judgment by confession cannot be reviewed on appeal is wholly inapplicable
to statutory appeals that are made triable -de novo. 37 This view was
taken by the Texas court in Ex parte Jones.38 There defendant had
pleaded guilty before a justice of the peace and appealed to the county
court. When the case was called in the county court the defendant
wanted to plead not guilty, but was denied the right to do so. The
Texas constitution provides that in all appeals from justice courts
there shall be a trial de novo. Upon appeal questioning this ruling by
the county court the Supreme Court said, "Without reviewing the statutes and constitutions of those states whose courts have held contrary
to the view we entertain, we deem it only necessary to say, the language
of our constitution and statutes as above quoted are so plain as to
almost demand apology for an argument or any other citation. A trial
de novo literally is a trial from the beginning, as if no former trial
had been had." The same question was before the Florida court
3 Fletcher v. State, 12 Ark. 169 (1850); Nicley v. Butcher, 81 W. Va. 247,
94 S. E. 147 (1917).
33 State v. Stevens, 3 Harr. (Del.) 479, 139 A. 78 (1927) ; Yeager v. State,

197 Ind. 401, 131 N. E. 42 (1921); State v. Hedges, 67 Kan. 176, 72 P. 528

(1903); State v. Funderburk, 130 S. C. 352, 126 S. E. 140 (1925); Weaver v.
Kimball, 59 Utah 72, 202 P. 9 (1921) ; Duckerson v. Commonwealth, 162 Va. 787,
173 S. E. 543 (1934).
"115 Mass. 151 (1874).

' State v. Down, 41 Idaho 199, 239 P. 279 (1925); Doench v. State, 89 Ind.
52, 165 N. E. 777 (1929).
3" Cline v. State, 25 Ind. 331, 58 N. E. 210 (1900); Commonwealth v. Blake,
94 Mass. 188 (1865).
Jenkins v. State, 173 Miss. 546, 54 So. 158 (1911).
" 128 Tex. Cr. App. 380, 81 S. W. (2d) 706 (1935).
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in State v. Frederick.3 9 The Florida constitution provides: "Appeal
from justice of the peace courts in criminal cases may be tried de novo
under such regulation as the legislature may prescribe." Pursuant to
this provision the legislature provided that the circuit court should
try all cases on appeal from justice of the peace courts de novo as
though the proceeding had been originally begun in the circuit court.
The defendant pleaded guilty of assault and battery before a justice,
was given four months in jail, and appealed to the circuit court, where
his appeal was dismissed. Considering a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court judge to reinstate the case the
Supreme Court said, "The right to appeal and demand a trial de novo
in the circuit court from a justice of the peace court conviction is
entirely regulated by statute. The statute imposes no limitation on
the right to appeal such as to confine the right only to those who have
pleaded not guilty. . . . Justice of the peace courts in Florida are not
courts of record. On the contrary they proceed with utmost informality. For the latter reason such courts are best made to serve
the purpose of justice through according to the accused an unconditional trial de novo in the circuit court under proper forms of accusations and before a judge and jury of the highest degree of capability."
The Virginia court, when confronted with the question in Dickerson
v. Commonwealth,40 reversed a former opinion in keeping with the
first view and adopted the third stated view. The circuit court had
dismissed defendant's appeal from a justice of the peace where he had
pleaded guilty. The Supreme Court when considering this ruling held
that the statutes there neither expressly nor by implication limit the
right to appeal to persons, convicted upon a plea of not guilty. The
case was remanded to the circuit court for a trial de novo with the
right to the accused to withdraw his plea of guilty. Courts adopting
this view are of the opinion that the former proceedings must be disregarded and find this to be the legislative intent in providing for
41
unrestricted appeals and de novo trials.
It is submitted that in the principal case if the statute is construed
to mean the same as statutes governing like situations from justice of
the peace courts the dissent is supported by the greater and better
authority.
CYRUs F.

124 Fla. 290, 168 So. 252 (1936).

"0Supra note 33.

"1People v. Richmond, 57 Mich. 399, 24 N. W. 124 (1885).
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